Forming a Better WEO is Important, but Not the First Priority

            It is too simple to look at organizational structure as a solution to global environmental regimes.  The structure is important, but so too are the terms of agreements and the scope of those agreements. The purpose of this paper is to argue that focusing on a better WEO is essentially overlooking a more important priority, and that regional environmental agreements should be considered as a potential alternative to global environmental accords. This paper does not intend to suggest that global environmental organizations should be abolished, but that much can be accomplished through less inclusive efforts.

            Arguing for a World Environmental Organization, Biermann suggests a few alternatives to the current global environmental organizational structure. However his assumptions on how these structural changes will help are not all convincing. His main premise is that a new organization, that has a legal personality and is better funded, would lead to improved technological and financial transfers as well as enforcement of environmental accords. These are certainly needed aspects of such an organization. However, no organization could get more out of the Copenhagen Accord. It is a failure to reach terms of an agreement, not organizational structure that prevented this accord from having relevance.

            Organizations are essential, after all the organizations facilitate and promote discussions on the international level. But these organizations do not create leverage. Leverage is needed to get some countries to agree. It is the case that some countries will sign on based on principle, but others require some sort of leverage. Concerning global environmental agreements, states worry about their competitiveness in trade.

For example the United States is unlikely to sign on to an accord (well one that has binding implementation levels) that China is exempt from. The United States and China trade a great deal. If the United States agrees to emit less, China could gain a competitive advantage because it may be more expensive for the United States to produce or transport a particular good. For this reason it can be insanely complicated to reach an agreement among dozens of states each worried about their competitive advantages. Discussions on environmental accords may be best focused at the regional level.

            These agreements are possible within the current structure and through Biermann’s proposals for a new World Environmental Organization. However, without a new WEO an agreement between three bodies could achieve regulation on over half of global emissions. China, the EU, and the US are the three biggest emitters, and have potential for signing an accord that has no reason to be voted on by a WEO. Of course an agreement would be difficult to accomplish. However, a possible negotiation on regulating over half of global emissions suggests a focus on smaller agreements on some issues could be much more efficient than reorganizing a WEO.

Regional agreement or not, Biermann is right in pointing out the value of such a WEO when it comes to measuring states’ adherence to accords, but his idea of enforcement through a central organization may be incomplete. He suggests using other world organizations as models, although these models do not necessarily transfer. The WTO promotes liberalized trade with the intention of making the included states more competitive relative to states not included. In global environmental politics, the states that do not opt into accords gain relative competitiveness. He may be on to something with the ILO because joining both the ILO and his WEO makes states less competitive by raising costs of production (although certainly increasing quality of life), but the ILO has the added power of focusing on an issue more immediately observable. The idea here is that global environmental politics is new and largely unique.

Improving the current global environmental organizations presents clear benefits. Yet a proper WEO would still have little impact in a global political sphere without strong environmental accords. The real top priority should be figuring out how to reach some kind of binding accord.

In addition to the Biermann article, background information for this paper came from class lectures and the websites of governments and international organizations.