Forming a Better WEO is Important, but Not the First Priority

            It is too simple to look at organizational structure as a solution to global environmental regimes.  The structure is important, but so too are the terms of agreements and the scope of those agreements. The purpose of this paper is to argue that focusing on a better WEO is essentially overlooking a more important priority, and that regional environmental agreements should be considered as a potential alternative to global environmental accords. This paper does not intend to suggest that global environmental organizations should be abolished, but that much can be accomplished through less inclusive efforts.

            Arguing for a World Environmental Organization, Biermann suggests a few alternatives to the current global environmental organizational structure. However his assumptions on how these structural changes will help are not all convincing. His main premise is that a new organization, that has a legal personality and is better funded, would lead to improved technological and financial transfers as well as enforcement of environmental accords. These are certainly needed aspects of such an organization. However, no organization could get more out of the Copenhagen Accord. It is a failure to reach terms of an agreement, not organizational structure that prevented this accord from having relevance.

            Organizations are essential, after all the organizations facilitate and promote discussions on the international level. But these organizations do not create leverage. Leverage is needed to get some countries to agree. It is the case that some countries will sign on based on principle, but others require some sort of leverage. Concerning global environmental agreements, states worry about their competitiveness in trade.

For example the United States is unlikely to sign on to an accord (well one that has binding implementation levels) that China is exempt from. The United States and China trade a great deal. If the United States agrees to emit less, China could gain a competitive advantage because it may be more expensive for the United States to produce or transport a particular good. For this reason it can be insanely complicated to reach an agreement among dozens of states each worried about their competitive advantages. Discussions on environmental accords may be best focused at the regional level.

            These agreements are possible within the current structure and through Biermann’s proposals for a new World Environmental Organization. However, without a new WEO an agreement between three bodies could achieve regulation on over half of global emissions. China, the EU, and the US are the three biggest emitters, and have potential for signing an accord that has no reason to be voted on by a WEO. Of course an agreement would be difficult to accomplish. However, a possible negotiation on regulating over half of global emissions suggests a focus on smaller agreements on some issues could be much more efficient than reorganizing a WEO.

Regional agreement or not, Biermann is right in pointing out the value of such a WEO when it comes to measuring states’ adherence to accords, but his idea of enforcement through a central organization may be incomplete. He suggests using other world organizations as models, although these models do not necessarily transfer. The WTO promotes liberalized trade with the intention of making the included states more competitive relative to states not included. In global environmental politics, the states that do not opt into accords gain relative competitiveness. He may be on to something with the ILO because joining both the ILO and his WEO makes states less competitive by raising costs of production (although certainly increasing quality of life), but the ILO has the added power of focusing on an issue more immediately observable. The idea here is that global environmental politics is new and largely unique.

Improving the current global environmental organizations presents clear benefits. Yet a proper WEO would still have little impact in a global political sphere without strong environmental accords. The real top priority should be figuring out how to reach some kind of binding accord.

In addition to the Biermann article, background information for this paper came from class lectures and the websites of governments and international organizations.

Trans-Boundary Freshwater: A Global Environmental Problem

         Similar to the climate change, whaling, and deforestation environmental regimes, attempts to combat the global environmental problem of freshwater availability and distribution has seen little success.  Transboundary freshwater resources, in particular, create various conflicts that need to be dealt with on an international level.  Protocols, like the 1997 UN Convention on the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, can be used to create rules and institutions that eliminate conflict and preserve important freshwater resources.  Like the unsuccessful protocols designed to deal with the aforementioned issues (Kyoto, the IWC, and UN-REDD), this convention could easily become ineffective.  The success of the freshwater regime and UN Convention can be determined by deciding how the problem is classified, what role certain countries play, and which powerful actors and economic motivations are involved.

Over 1 billion people lack access to safe drinking water worldwide.  Increased demand from population growth and unequal distribution of freshwater, exacerbated by climate change, create numerous conflicts over the rights and responsibilities to utilize and protect a shared watercourse. Globally, 145 nations contain the 263 trans-boundary lakes and river basins—of these, 19 are shared between more than five nations.  Despite the many trans-boundary freshwater flows, cooperative frameworks exist for only about 60% of them, and of these 80% are between only two countries (known as “partial” agreements).  

         The UN Convention on the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses is the only universal treaty governing shared freshwater resources.  The key principles expressed in the treaty include: equitable and reasonable utilization of water resources, application of appropriate measures to prevent harm to other users, and prior notification of planned measures involving the shared water source.  Though these principles seem positive and fair to all parties, the treaty has yet to be ratified or see much success for a variety of reasons.

Depending on how it is framed, the overall environmental problem of freshwater resources could fall under any of the four classifications: a trans-boundary externality when one state pollutes into water that flows into another state; a linked issue when the quality of water is negatively affected by development or when water is redistributed through globalization and trade; or a global commons problem when regarding the overall water cycle as a common heritage of mankind, under no one jurisdiction.  In this particular example, trans-boundary water resources best embody a shared natural resource problem—including a freshwater resource that stretches across two or more state borders. The UN Convention seeks to create institutions and rules for creating joint management regimes and agreements between states, which is often the most effective way to combat shared natural resource problems.

In order for the convention to be put into force it needs to be ratified by 35 states.  As of now, 33 states have ratified, with several others signing on and awaiting ratification.  The main pusher states include countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, a region facing some of the most dire and complicated water scarcity and distribution issues.  Certain EU countries—such as Germany—that tend to favor international environmental reform, have also ratified the treaty.  The biggest dragger states, which voted against the treaty from the beginning, are Burundi, China, and Turkey—all upper-riparian states reluctant to give up rights to their water resources.  

The UN Convention has positive goals and is close to meeting its 35 necessary ratifications to be entered into force—but it cannot be considered a success by any description of the word.  Using the legal approach, it was unsuccessful because—although all but three UN members voted for it—only 33 actually ratified it and compliance is low.  Because freshwater problems have grown since the formation of the treaty, it can also be seen as unsuccessful under the problem-solving approach.  The words in the treaty demonstrate a desire to solve water problems justly and economically efficiently, but until it is entered into force there is no telling whether or not the problems are actually solved in this manner.

In order to avoid the failures of past regimes, the UN Conventional on International Watercourses needs to have power and economic drivers at its aid.  Powerful countries (like the US, who has yet to ratify the treaty) are often predictors of the success of a convention, agreement, or proposed solution.  Another predicting factor are the economic drivers—if a state finds it economically advantageous to comply with a treaty (like the Montreal Protocol) it often will.   

I believe that freshwater is such an important resource that, as questions of trans-boundary water conflicts arise, states will be more and more motivated to form agreements and comply with treaties to distribute and protect the shared resource.  The UN Convention on the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses could, if put into force and implemented correctly, become an effective tool for creating fair and effective institutions and rules for dealing with shared freshwater resources.  

Modeling a global environmental organization off of WHO.

There are many instances in the literature we have read that state the structure and presence of a world or international environmental organization would function like existing organizations such as the World Health Organization, or WHO, the International Labor Organization (ILO), or the World Trade Organization (WTO).  At the present time, global environmental governance does not have the central anchor that these organizations serve to there respective areas of focus.  In this blog, I will outline the purposes, structure, organization, and functions of the World Health Organization and attempt to outline how a world environmental organization could be modeled similarly.
The WHO was established on April 7, 1948 as an agency of the United Nations, with its headquarters located in Geneva, Switzerland. Since it's establishment, the WHO has been at the forefront of most public health advancements, including the eradication of smallpox.
WHO has six established global regions- Africa, the Americas, the Eastern Mediterranean, Europe, Southeast Asia, and the Western Pacific. Breaking down the globe into these six smaller regions allows the leaders of the organization and regions themselves to focus on the particular health needs of each region.  We mentioned a similar concept in class today, discussing the positives and negatives of dividing the world into regions so that each region could identify and address their pertinent environmental issues.  In some regions like parts of the Americas, the most common causes of death are diseases such as cardiovascular or coronary heart disease, but in some parts of the African region, the major threats may be poor sanitation or communicable or infectious diseases such as malaria or HIV. Similar to health differences around the world, environmental concerns may differ as well.  Some areas of the world may be more concerned with acid rain than others and, as we saw in the readings, some areas, like coastal African countries, may be more concerned with toxic waste.  In the WHO, many decisions are made at the regional level, allowing the leaders regional directors to be more communicative with those that live there and the policies and guidelines to be more effective and pertinent.  A similar system of governance could be adopted in a global environmental organization, allowing regions to focus on their own needs first instead of having to agree to treaties that may not even address their concerns.  Obviously, the WHO also concerns itself with issues that do effect the entire global population as well.  A global environmental organization would also address issues like climate change.
In 1948, there were 61 countries signed into membership in the WHO and by 2013, that number had expanded to 194.  A state becomes a member by adopting and ratifying the constitution of the WHO. The WHO still has the ability to function, carry out health research, publish findings and communicate health guidelines even if there are states or nations that are not members. A world environmental organization could exist in a similar manner. We have read literature explaining that conferences and treaties have failed because nations have declined to ratify them.  It would be beneficial to have an environmental organization existing as a governing and guideline body where nations can join when they have the ability to or agree to abide by the constitution or treaty of that environmental organization.
The WHO is also made up of several smaller departments and programs, each with specific focuses. Some examples are the Polio Eradication Initiative, the Initiative for Vaccine Research, and the International Programme on Chemical Safety.  These smaller programs are developed to address the issues that arise.  If a global environmental organization were to exist, similar programs or initiatives could be adopted to address the matters at hand.  There could be a program on climate change, a program on water pollution, a program on deforestation, and so on. Breaking down the responsibilities of the entire organization in a model similar to that of the WHO would allow environmental concerns to be researched and addressed, for policies to be developed and possibly implemented, and for national governments to be well informed about such issues.  These task forces could exist all under the umbrella of a global environmental organization.


All background info came from readings in class, WHO/UN websites and publications and documents.

Who's going to hold onto the environmental hot potato?

As an international development minor, the impact of the current climate change crisis on the relationship between industrialized and developing countries strikes me as a crucial element to the future global stage. While international conventions say that everyone needs to do their part, who’s to say who is to blame for the environmental crisis?

Taking responsibility for climate change issues in a country’s domestic legislation is like a political hot potato that no one wants to hold onto. When you look from the view of a state, why would you? Who is going to willingly cut back on their oil usage for more efficient but much more expensive green technology? Who is going to say, it’s okay, we’ll stop trading so much because of the transportation costs, we won’t produce as much for our people and lose competitiveness on the international stage, you other countries just keep doing what you’re doing and we’ll willingly pay more money and fall behind. Not a chance.

Of course, OECD countries are historically the main emitters of CO2 emissions and through the Western industrialization period in the late 1800s and early 1900s, it can be argued that they are the ones who got us into this mess. Plus because of this industrialization they have much higher GDPs (among other reasons), so shouldn’t they pay? Theoretically yes, but they won’t, and here’s why: developing countries aren’t strong enough to make them. As we’ve seen in the reading about the shrimp turtle case, trade has a huge influence on a country’s decision-making process.

For example, if the US were dependent on Southeast Asian shrimp in this case they would have never argued against the product due to environmental protection laws. So if a small country like the Philippines decided they didn’t like the practices of US corn farms, would they restrict trade? Probably not since they would lose resources and the local economy would suffer. The same concept can answer why developing countries cannot force OECD countries to rightfully spend their much more abundant resources on improving CO2 emissions. If they did, they risk losing their trade relations and severely injuring their GDP and country’s development.

So if the developing countries don’t have the economical push needed to make OECD countries pay, what happens next? Countries meet in huge gatherings like the Kyoto protocol and Montreal and try to come to agreements so that everyone does a little bit more to make things better. Then, much like college group projects, no one does that much until something bad happens like a huge international environmental crisis (or when your project is due the next day).

Then the blame game begins and everyone looks to who is increasing CO2 emissions today as opposed to the countries that have gotten us into this mess. Guess who? Developing countries. Many up and coming countries such as China, India, countries throughout Africa, and others are going through their industrial revolution right now due to new technologies and more stable economies. It only seems fair that they need to stop their current practices that are emitting black smoke from their factories into the air and black sludge into the rivers.

However, after industrialized countries did all these things and more and were giving the chance to build their economy to the point where they can afford green technology, OECD countries may not have the right to tell emerging economies they cannot continue. With this viewpoint, the safest way to attack the issue might be to make everyone decrease the country’s greenhouse gases by a certain percentage. This runs into a capacity issue. If every country is meant to decrease their impact by 20 percent, a country like the US may be able but unwilling, while a country like the Philippines may not be able to stop their production status and continue to provide for their population.

So this is the situation we find ourselves in. Developed countries have contributed the most to the situation in the past but don’t have much obligation to change their ways. Developing countries are contributing now but don’t want to stop their production and can’t make developed countries change in fear of losing trade. Round and round it goes, with no one wanted to hold on to the responsibility of the ever increasing and threatening global warming. This post has asked a lot of questions, but the ultimate question is this: what is going to have to happen to make countries realize that if we continue in the same way, we might not have a world at all?

Environmental Problems: The ACF River Basin Conflict

            Often when dealing with a particular environmental issue, the process of classification is fairly straightforward, and to the point.  However, in the case of the ACF River Basin, classifying the environmental problem occurring within this region may prove to be quite complicated, and solving this issue may be even more of a challenge.  This may deal with the complexity of this issue, which can make it somewhat difficult to apply it to one distinct classification.  When taking a look at the ACF River Basin conflict, one might even argue that the issue falls under a number of classifications.

            The ACF River Basin conflict, also known as the “tri-state water dispute”, is an environmental problem that involves Florida, Alabama, and Georgia, and the rights they have over two major river basins that are shared by the three states.  This ongoing issue centers on the threats presented by the overconsumption of freshwater in the ACF River Basin, and has been occurring since 1990.  This river basin is not only needed by all three states as a source of drinking water, but also for agriculture, fisheries, as well as energy production, so the issue primarily centers on how to fairly allocate it.  And because this water supply is so heavily relied on by the entire region, these states are also faced with the challenge of conserving it as well.

            The first of the four types of environmental problems mentioned in class includes shared natural resource problems.  This is most likely the best suited classification of the problem involved with the tri-state water dispute, as it essentially describes the issue at hand; the ACF River Basin being the shared natural resource.  However, solving this issue has by no means been easy, as it has been going on for over twenty years.  One potential answer may be to bring in an outside mediator, such as a district court from another state, in order to avoid a biased decision in determining how to best deal with the situation.  The level of demand required by each of the states involved in this conflict makes setting limits for sharing this resource extremely difficult to assess.  

            The second type of environmental problems discussed includes trans-boundary externality problems, and while the issues of the ACF River Basin primarily deal with allocating the water source, this classification may apply in situations where one of the three states significantly pollutes a portion of the river basin.  Such a case might include an accident occurring at a nuclear power plant located within the river basin, or perhaps an incident that negatively impacts its fisheries.  

            While the tri-state river dispute does not fall under the classification of a linked issue problem, it in some way represents a global commons problem on a much smaller scale. This is simply due to the fact that a number of states with separate jurisdictions are all consuming a single “common” resource.  The issues regarding the ACF River Basin can be applied to the tragedy of the commons in that a number of separate entities are all consuming more water than they should be, which in turn will negatively impact all of them in the long term.  Using this classification, however, would probably still not be the most appropriate means of identifying this particular issue.

            Although one could make the argument that the ACF River Basin conflict can take on multiple classifications, it is probably most accurately described as a shared resource problem.  This is not only the simplest classification for this issue, but the one that best suits it as well.  However, finding a solution to this environmental problem is still an uncertain and ongoing process that many take many more years to resolve.